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Abstract
This paper analyses the effects of macroeconomic shocks in a monetary union with the aid of 
a two-country model of the EMU. Our analysis serves two purposes. First, we show how 
asymmetries between countries might matter in terms of the resulting business cycle 
fluctuations. More specifically, we do not only allow for country-specific shocks but also for 
cross-national differences in wage behaviour. Secondly, we show by means of numerical 
simulations how fiscal policy can be used to dampen business cycle fluctuations in various 
(a)symmetric settings. We consider two types of fiscal policy, national fiscal stabilisation and 
stabilisation from a federal system of fiscal transfers between countries, and we derive their 
welfare implications. The main innovation of the paper is to illustrate how structural 
differences between countries, e.g. a varying degree of wage rigidity, help to determine the 
impact of macroeconomic shocks and the effectiveness of fiscal policy. So far, this kind of 
asymmetry has been given little attention in the literature on fiscal policy in the EMU.
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1. Introduction
On January 1, 1999 the European Union (EU) countries that satisfy the convergence criteria of 
the Maastricht Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will form a monetary union 
by adopting a common currency, the Euro, and a common central bank, the European Central 
Bank (ECB). In its influential study ‘One Market, One Money’ the European Commission 
analysed in detail the possible costs and benefits of the EMU. A common currency is expected 
to entail static and dynamic efficiency gains from the elimination of conversion costs and 
exchange rate uncertainty in intra-EU trade and investment and from a greater transparency of 
goods, labour and financial markets in the EU. A common currency is envisaged as a logical 
extension of the Single Market Program by the European Commission: a common currency 
without a common market or a common market without a common currency cannot yield the 
full gains from economic integration in the EU. Therefore, EMU is expected to strongly 
support the process of economic (and political) integration in the EU. In addition, seigniorage 
gains may entail if the Euro is widely used in international trade and international reserves 
outside the EU and the EU could have a stronger bargaining position in international 
macroeconomic policy coordination. The main drawback of replacing national currencies by a 
common currency results from the loss of national monetary policy -and particularly the 
instrument of exchange rate adjustment- as a macroeconomic policy instrument.
Given these alleged benefits of monetary union, the ‘optimal currency area’ theory focuses 
on the costs of monetary union and tries to determine whether it is efficient for a country to 
enter a monetary union or rather to keep its national currency and monetary policy autonomy. 
More particular, the optimal currency area literature concludes that a national currency 
remains favourable: (i) the more macroeconomic shocks in a monetary union are asymmetric, 
(ii) the larger the rigidities in goods and labour markets, (iii) the less is the amount of trade 
with the other countries of a monetary union, (iv) the lower is labour mobility and (v) the 
smaller is the automatic stabilisation by federal government spending and taxation.
By now a large literature has developed in which the role of macroeconomic stabilisation 
policies after the establishment of the EMU is analysed. In these analyses the distinction 
between symmetric or EMU-wide and asymmetric or country-specific macroeconomic shocks 
is crucial. Empirical studies indicate that asymmetric shocks are indeed fairly important in the 
EU and it may even be argued, see for instance Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996), that these 
shocks may become even more important in the future in the case of the EU. Moreover, also 
empirical evidence on substantial goods and labour market rigidities, low labour mobility and 
a very low amount of automatic stabilisation from federal fiscal policies has been found. 
Empirical studies on symmetric and asymmetric shocks in the EU include Weber (1991),
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Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), Bayoumi and Prassad (1995), Christodoulakis, Dimelis and 
Kollintzas (1995), Helg et al. (1995) and Karras (1996). Most studies find a distinction 
between a group of 'core' countries whose macroeconomic shocks tend to be more 
symmetrical, and a group of 'peripheral' countries whose macroeconomic shock are more 
asymmetric. Labour mobility in the EU has been studied by Decressin and Fatas (1995) and 
Abraham (1995). The automatic stabilisation from the EU budget was investigated by 
Goodhart and Smith (1993), von Hagen (1991) and Bayoumi (1994) who all conclude that it 
is very small.
The loss of national monetary policy autonomy in EMU implies that the adjustment burden 
from macroeconomic stabilisation in the EU is shifted largely to national fiscal policy, given a 
setting with an independent price-stability oriented ECB and the absence of a sizeable federal 
fiscal budget. From that perspective, it might seem counterintuitive that the Maastricht Treaty 
proposed the ‘Excessive Deficit’ procedure that should prevent countries from running 
sustained fiscal deficits. Furthermore, the recently establishes ‘Stability Pact’ seems to limit 
the possibility for national governments to implement countercyclical fiscal policies. From the 
viewpoint of macroeconomic stabilisation this set of fiscal restrictions may turn to be 
inefficient, in particular in cases where EU countries are hit by prolonged asymmetric shocks 
in a setting with goods and labour market rigidities, low labour mobility and no automatic 
stabilisation from federal taxation and spending.
This paper analyses the problem of fiscal stabilisation policy in a two-country model of 
EMU that features not only the possibility of asymmetric shocks but -and herein lies the main 
innovation of the paper- also takes into account that the EU countries may feature institutional 
and structural disparities. An -admittedly stylized- theoretical framework is developed 
featuring different degrees of symmetry concerning macroeconomic shocks and institutional 
and structural characteristics. Concerning the latter, we focus on the possibility that EU 
countries can differ in terms of their wage formation institutions. In our model these 
differences are reflected in possible differences in the degree of wage indexation. It is a well- 
established fact that European countries are far from uniform as far as wage flexibility is 
concerned. Given these two potential sources of asymmetries we show how fiscal flexibility at 
the national level as well as a system of intra-European fiscal transfers might mitigate the 
business cycle fluctuations. The idea of a transfer system to stabilise economic fluctuations 
induced by ideosyncratic shocks under EMU was formulated by van der Ploeg (1991). 
Subsequent studies on the design of such transfer systems by Italianer and van Heukelen 
(1993), Melitz and Vori (1993) and von Hagen and Hammond (1995) further developed this 
concept.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces a stylized two-country model of the
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EMU. In section 3 the model is used to simulate the effects of symmetric and asymmetric 
shocks under various assumptions concerning the degree of wage rigidity. In our simulations 
we consider three regimes: (i) no fiscal stabilisation at all, (ii) fiscal stabilisation on the 
national level and (iii) fiscal stabilisation by means of a federal fiscal transfer system. The 
welfare implications of each regime are also investigated. In section 4 we vary specific 
parameters of our model to see whether and how this affects our conclusions with respect to 
the effectiveness of fiscal stabilisation policy. We also formulate the main policy implications 
that result from the analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. A Two-Country EMU Model
The analytical model that is used to study fiscal stabilisation in a monetary union is based on 
the two or more country Mundell-Fleming models that have been widely used to analyse the 
international transmission of monetary and fiscal policies and problems in international policy 
coordination, e.g. by Turnovsky (1986), Miller and Williamson (1988), Manasse (1991) and 
Sheen (1992). Traditionally, numerical simulations with large scale multi-country variants 
have been widely used for policy analysis. Bryant et al. (1988) have studied the setup and 
results that are obtained with the aid of such large multi-country models and their use in 
macroeconomic policy design. Basically, these models are large scale variants of the Mundell- 
Fleming model. Krugman (1993), moreover, notes that the latter remains “the workhorse of 
international policy analysis”, despite its obvious limitations due to the lack of explicit 
microeconomic foundations.
Assume that EMU has been fully implemented, implying that the national central banks are 
replaced by the ECB and national currencies by a common currency, the Euro. Assume also 
that there is no labour mobility between both countries. To reduce complexity we ignore the 
interaction with economies outside the monetary union. We also ignore strategic behaviour 
among policy makers1. In order to be able to analyse the effects of fiscal policy in an EMU 
that features symmetric and asymmetric macroeconomic shocks and possible structural 
disparities in terms of wage rigidity, the model includes the following elements. First, the 
exchange rate is irrevocably fixed in a monetary union but in the short-run relative price 
differences between the two countries are possible. Secondly, the supply side is modeled in 
such a way as to allow for nominal and real consumption wage rigidity. Thirdly, the model 
allows for (a)symmetric shocks in goods demand, wages and money demand. Fourthly, two 
fiscal policy instruments are included, (i) national fiscal stabilisation and (ii) a European
1 This would call for a three country EMU model. See Eichengreen en Ghironi (1997) for such a three 
country EMU analysis. Their analysis focuses on strategic interaction between the policy makers under EMU.
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Federal Transfer System (EFTS). Finally, in a monetary union there is a common money 
market which is cleared by the common interest rate. Demand for the common currency is 
exerted by agents of both EU countries and its supply is controlled by the ECB.
We consider first the supply-side of the economy and the wage formation process. Eqs. (1)-
(3) constitute the supply-side of our model.
11=y (1a)V
,1i= ( 1b)
w= ^ p c + u w (2a)
w* = n* p c* + u w* (2b)
p c = yp  + (1- y) p * (3a)
p c  = y* p * + (1- y *) p (3b)
in which, ys, denotes aggregate real supply of goods, w, the nominal wage rate, p, the output 
price level, pc, the consumer price level and uW a wage shock that may occur. Foreign 
variables are marked by an asterisk. Variables are in logs and expressed as deviations from 
their long-run non-inflationary equilibrium. In the analysis the natural rate of output is 
normalised to zero2. ( 1) gives aggregate supply of goods in both countries as a increasing 
function of real wages. Nominal wages in (2) depend on the degree of indexation of wages: if 
H=0 nominal consumption wage rigidity prevails whereas in case of |i= 1, wages are fully 
indexed to consumer prices and real consumption wage rigidity prevails. Wages may also 
change because of exogenous wage shocks. (3) defines the consumer price index as a 
weighted average of domestic prices and foreign prices weighted by their shares in 
expenditure y and 1-y .
Next, we consider the aggregate demand side of both economies and here we assume the 
following structure:
y d=a c - ôr +oy * +q s +u d
y d* =-a* c-ô* r* + o*y + q* s* +ud* (4a)
c =p  - p  (4b)
s = f+ z  (5)
s* = f* - z  (6a)
(4) relates aggregate demand, ƒ*, to competitiveness, c, the real interest rate, r, foreign output, 
an index of the fiscal stance, s, and an exogenous demand shock, Ud that may hit the economy.
(5) defines competitiveness of country 1 relative to country 2 (remember that the exchange 
rate is irrevocably fixed). The fiscal stance in (6) is defined as the sum of the fiscal deficit f  -
2 See Giomo et.al. (1995) on the methodology of estimating potential output, output gaps and structural 
deficits. European Commission (1995) estimates the NAIRU for the EU countries and divides total 
unemployment into its cyclical and structural components.
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defined as government spending minus taxes-, plus the net transfer z received from/given to 
country 2 .
Fiscal policy on the national level is set according to the following countercyclical 
stabilisation rule:
f =~ 3 y  (7a)
r  =- x* y* (7b)
Fiscal policy is aimed at stabilising output fluctuations around equilibrium output which has 
been normalised to zero as noted earlier. The degree to which it does so depends critically on
x3.
The EFTS system is devised such as to alleviate the adjustment burden from asymmetric 
economic developments. These developments may stem from two sources: country-specific 
shocks and/or differences in wage setting behaviour. As will be shown in section 3 the latter 
may give rise to transfers even if the shocks are symmetric. The transfer system automatically 
transfers resources from countries experiencing a boom to countries that suffer from a 
recession. One can think of various institutional peculiarities that characterise the set-up of 
such a transfer system but we decided to included the simplest transfer system that we could 
think of in our model4:
z = ! (y* -  y) (8)
If the home country is in a recession, i.e. y<0 and the foreign country is not or to a lesser 
extent, i.e. y*>y, the EFTS implies an automatic stabilising fiscal transfer from country 2 to 
country 1 and vice versa. From (8) it is clear that transfers only arise if relative output 
differences occur. Therefore, the EFTS stabilises in the first place cross-country differences in 
output fluctuations in the EU, whereas national fiscal policies stabilise national output 
fluctuations. It is for this reason (see section 3) that the use of the two fiscal policy 
instruments leads to different output and price adjustments.
Agents of both EMU countries exert demand for the common currency. Money demand is 
assumed to be a function of the common nominal interest rate, i, output, y, and an exogenous 
velocity shock, um,
3 See Manasse (1991) for empirical estimates of % and ^ for the period 1973-1984 in the case of Italy, 
Germany, Japan, U.S., Canada, France and the U.K.
4 It is important to distinguish between the stabilising and restributive dimensions of fiscal transfer systems. 
Since the transfer system is based on the relative business cycle position of both countries it is essentially a 
stabilisation device. A redistributive device would redistribute income from countries with a high level of GDP 
(per capita) to countries with a low level. On the issue of redistribution in the EMU see also various 
contributions in EC Commission (1993).
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m - p  = ky  - A i + u m (9a)
m* -p* = K*y* -  A* i + um* (9b)
i = r +p  (10a)
i = r* + p* (10b)
(9) gives the demand for the common currency in both countries whereas (10) defines the 
nominal interest rate as the real interest minus the rate of producer price inflation. Note that 
the assumption of a common nominal interest rate implies that inflation differentials must be 
matched by offsetting changes in the real interest rates. Shocks in our model have only a 
temporary impact which in case of inflation implies that inflation is zero in the long run. The 
situation of price level stability therefore means in terms of (10) that real interest rates are 
equal in the long run. Equilibrium on the common money market implies that the supply of 
the common currency, mF, that is controlled by the ECB, equals the demand for the common 
currency by the economic agents of both EMU countries. This equilibrium condition, 
mE =m+m*, therefore, gives the nominal interest rate that clears the European money market5:
1
X +X*
(k j+ k * j*  + p + p* + u m + um* - m E) ( ¡ i )i
The Phillips curve relates price adjustment to the output gap and implies a short-run trade­
off between inflation and output:
p = v y  ( 12a)
p* = v * y* ( 12b)
Hence, prices adjust sluggishly to shocks (and the resulting output gap) and the model 
displays Keynesian features in the short-run. In the long run, however, price adjustments will 
ensure that the actual level of output equals the natural level of output and that inflation is 
zero.6 Depending on the adjustment coefficient v in (12), macroeconomic shocks can generate 
prolonged and costly output fluctuations in the EU economies (alongside with the costs 
associated with price adjustments). Sluggish output and price adjustment, therefore, creates a 
case for designing active macroeconomic stabilisation policies that alleviate business cycle
5 Alternatively, we could analyse a setting where the ECB targets the nominal EU interest rate, i. As first 
shown by Poole (1970), monetary targeting and interest targeting lead to different macroeconomic outcomes if 
macroeconomic shocks occur. More in line with the intentions of the Bundesbank -and with the expected 
policies of the ECB-, we assume here that the ECB in the first place uses monetary targeting as guiding 
principle in its monetary policy. In the simulations in section 3 we assume that monetary policy is not used to 
stabilise the economies and that the money supply is held fixed.
6 In the limiting case of v->«>, full adjustment is achieved instantaneously and output remains is always on its 
natural rate. Some constant could be added to (12) to reflect some positive core inflation rate caused by factors 
outside the scope of the model.
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fluctuations and the divergences in the output cycles of both EMU countries. In the remainder 
of this paper we will not be concerned with the question whether fiscal policy can have an 
impact on the level of output (because this is assumed to be the case), but we will instead 
focus on the question as to how the effectiveness of fiscal policies is affected by the various 
(a)symmetries in economic shocks and the wage formation.
The model features a number of important channels through which the economies interact 
with eachother:
(i) by the import leakages, o and o*, output fluctuations in one country are automatically 
transmitted partially to the other country,
(ii) if  output price adjustment differs in both countries, competitiveness, c, is affected. The 
fluctuations in competitiveness on their turn affect output adjustment because of the 
sensitivity -as measured by a  and a*- of aggregate demand to competitiveness.
(iii) because consumer price inflation is a weighted average of domestic and foreign output 
price fluctuations, inflation in one country is partially transmitted to higher inflation also in 
the other country, depending on the weight y of domestic goods in total consumption.
y, a  and o -and their foreign counterparts- are model parameters that measure the degree of 
integration of the two EU economies and have an important role in the transmission of shocks 
between the two countries. Higher values of these parameters imply that both economies are 
more integrated and that the various spillovers from foreign policies and foreign 
macroeconomic shocks increase.
(iv) monetary conditions in one country transmit themselves immediately to the other country 
through the adjustment in the common money market. Similarly, monetary policy of the ECB 
would have a direct impact on both countries because of its transmission through the common 
money market.
(v) fiscal stabilisation policies in one country will -because of the various interactions between 
both countries- also affect output and price adjustment in the other country.
(vi) the fiscal transfer provides a supra-national stabilisation instrument that reduces 
divergences in intra-EU divergences in output and price fluctuations.
Model Solution
It is useful to outline the procedure to solve the model. Appendix A provides a detailed 
derivation. While the model has been kept highly simple, solving the model produces rather 
complicated expressions because of the various interdependencies between both EMU 
countries. Combining (1)-(3) enables us to write aggregate supply in both countries. 
Aggregate demand in both economies is derived from (4)-(8) and (10)-(11). Equilibrium
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output in both countries follows when imposing the conditions that the aggregate supply and 
aggregate demand of domestic goods must be equalized, i.e. ƒ = yd (and that similarly ys*=yd*), 
and that the common nominal interest rate, i, clears the European money market, (11).
Substituting the resulting expression into the Phillips curve (12) gives the dynamics of 
price adjustment in both economies,
(15)P
a11 a12 P +u1
p*. a21 <N2a2 P*. u2
The definitions of atj and ut are given in the Appendix. The different macroeconomic shocks 
are assumed to hit the economy at t=0 and to phase out with a speed p7. Because non­
linearities in ux and u2 prevent an analytical solution of (15), we rely entirely on numerical 
simulations of (15) in our analysis of economic shocks and fiscal policy in the next section. 
Given (15), the fiscal policy stance can be derived: from the price dynamics the adjustment of 
output follows according to (12), which in turn determines fiscal deficits according to (7) and 
fiscal transfers according to (8).
The degree of consumer wage indexation is a main determinant of the price and output 
adjustment following a shock. In case nominal wage rigidity prevails, i.e. if |i=0, prices and 
output adjust relatively smoothly compared to the case of real wage rigidity, i.e. if  |i=1, where 
adjustment take more time (see (1))8. The degree of wage indexation, |i, is thus an important 
parameter in our model. In the remainder of the analysis we will focus on differences in |i to 
study a monetary union between countries that display structural disparities.9 Indeed, it is 
often asserted that there are important intra-European differences in labour markets 
characteristics like wage formation, degree of unionisation, generosity of unemployment 
benefits and employment protection legislation (OECD (1994), Anderton and Barrell (1991), 
Heylen and van Poeck (1995) and Bertola and Ichino (1995)).
For our present purposes it suffices to observe that our "proxy" for structural labour market 
differences, the degree of consumer wage indexation, is found to vary considerably across 
European countries (see e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), pp. 404-408, Vinals and
7 This implies that ui=ui(0).exp(-p,./) and ui*=ui*(0).exp(-p*) where i={d,w,m }.
8 In his analysis of international cooperation of monetary or fiscal policies, Sheen (1992), also allows for the 
simultaneous interaction of demand and supply factors. Four regimes are distinguished in his analysis: (i) 
nominal wage rigidity (^=0), (ii) real wage rigidity (^=1), (iii) a ‘Keynesian’ regime (^=0 and P-*00) and (iv) a 
‘Neo-Classical’ regime (P=0).
9 To keep things as simple as possible we assume that a country is characterised by either complete nominal 
wage rigidity (^=0 ) or complete real wage rigidity (^=1 ).
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Jimeno (1996), pp.13-14 and McMorrow, (1996), section 2.2). Keeping in mind the Lucas 
critique, one may argue against our idea of differences in |i in the sense that the EMU can lead 
to a convergence of labour market institutions, and in particular of |i, across the EMU 
countries (de Grauwe (1994), pp. 32-34). Even if such a convergence would occur it will 
probably be incomplete and take a considerable amount of time to materialise. Furthermore, 
monetary policy is just one of the determinants in the wage formation process. It is for these 
reasons that we assume that differences in the degree of wage indexation persist even after the 
EMU has been established.
We do not only analyse the impact on output and prices of different types of shocks and the 
policy reactions, but also we want to assess their impact on social welfare. We assume that 
social welfare in each country depends on the level of output, the rate of inflation and on the 
level of the fiscal deficit and the level of transfers:
m =/W O 2 * 5 ,p  c(t)2 *52 f t ) * 53 z(t)2>e 0<' wdt
t '  ''0
L •('„) = f l y '( ')2 * 5.' p " ( ') 2 * 52 f '( ')2 * 53 z(')2!e '"’dt (16b>
in which 5 1 denotes the weight attached to price stability, 5 2 the weight that is given to deficit 
stabilisation, 5 3 the weight that is given to fiscal transfers and 0 the rate of time preference.10 
Fiscal deficits may entail costs because they could imply that sanctions are imposed upon a 
country according to the ‘Excessive Deficit’ procedure of the EMU Treaty and, in the future, 
to requirements of the ‘Stability Pact’". The transfer system may cause welfare losses because 
of the monitoring, compliance and administrative costs that are associated with its operating. 
Moreover, it is sometimes argued that fiscal transfers are likely to create 'moral hazard' and 
dependency problems, in particular when they have a sizeable structural component.
3. Simulations with the EMU Model
t0
This section analyses the effects of macroeconomic shocks hitting the two EMU economies 
under different degrees of structural symmetry between both countries. Both countries may
10 Note that we do not rule out that both countries differ in their preferences on output and price stability. 
Alesina and Grilli (1993) show that differences in preferences with respect to price and output stability might 
further reduce the scope for an efficient monetary union: it is shown that if macroeconomic shocks in a 
monetary union are more asymmetric and preferences of a country differ more from the EU average that a 
monetary union for this country becomes less likely to be efficient.
11 A detailed analysis of the setup and workings of the ‘Stability Pact’ is provided by Buti et al. (1997).
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vary in the degree to which (i) macroeconomic shocks are (a)symmetric, (ii) wage formation 
is (a)symmetric. The latter is proxied by (a)symmetric values of the wage indexation 
parameter |i. To do so, we provide numerical simulations of the two-country EMU model 
discussed in the previous section. We focus our attention on the effects of transitory, 
contractionary macroeconomic shocks in the EMU. At the incidence of a negative demand 
shock, a positive wage shock or a negative velocity shock an instantaneous decline in output 
is evoked because of a Keynesian multiplier effect. The shock is also transmitted to the other 
country through the import leakage. The output decline, however, initiates a gradual price 
adjustment until output is back at its natural level and price level stability is restored.
Our simulation analysis serves two purposes. First, we want to explore the effects of the 
macroeconomic disturbances in different structural configurations of the EMU. Second, given 
the effects of the different macroeconomic shocks in the different EMU configurations, we 
want to study how national and federal fiscal stabilisation can be used to stabilise output and 
price fluctuations in the EMU.
For the sake of brevity and consistency the simulations focus on a negative demand shock. 
This is also convenient because a positive wage shock or a negative velocity shock have 
similar qualitative effects in our model as can be seen in Appendix A. In all simulations we 
first consider outcomes under a regime with no fiscal flexibility and no federal transfer 
system, EMU(A), where 3=3 *=!=0. In this regime, shocks do not provoke any reaction in 
terms of fiscal policy. It is a useful exercise to compare this benchmark to cases where 
stabilisation policy is undertaken. The need for fiscal flexibility for individual countries 
and/or a federal fiscal transfer mechanism may actually increase under a monetary union as 
countries have given up the possibility to stabilise their individual business cycle fluctuations 
by means of national monetary policy. This argument in particular holds if there is low wage 
and price flexibility, low labour mobility and no automatic stabilisation from federal fiscal 
policies. Therefore, a second regime with fiscal flexibility but no system of transfers EFTS, 
EMU(B), is studied with 3=3*>0 and !=0. Finally, a third regime, EMU(C), will be 
considered in which there is only an EFTS to stabilise the economy: 3=3*=0 and !>0. The 
parameter values that underlie all simulations in section 3 are reported in Table 1.
Tabel 1
Modelparameters that Underlie the Simulations
country 1____________________ country 2
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p 1 P* 1
M 0 / 1 M* 0 / 1
Y 0.7 * 0.7
a 0.5 * 0.5
6 0.3 * 0.3
a 0.5 * 0.5
■n 0.7 * 0.7
V 0.15 * 0.15
K 1 * 1
X 0.4 * 0.4
X 0/0.25 * 0/0.25
5 0/0.25
1 1* 1
l|i2 2.5 ^ 2* 2.5
^3 2.5 3* 2.5
P 0.15 P* 0.15
The outline of the analysis is as follows: section 3.1 studies symmetric macroeconomic 
shocks in an EMU that consists of symmetric countries in terms of wage indexation. Section 
3.2 studies the effects of symmetric shocks with asymmetric wage indexation, i.e. one country 
displays nominal wage rigidity whereas the other country is characterized by real wage 
rigidity. In section 3.3 asymmetric shocks are analysed in a setting with uniform wage 
formation. Finally, in section 3.4 the case of asymmetric shocks and cross-country differences 
in wage indexation is analysed.
3.1 Symmetric Shocks in an EMU with Uniform Wage Formation
Consider first a negative aggregate demand shock of 1% that hits both EU countries at t=0. 
Figure 1 in Appendix B shows the resulting adjustment pattern of output, prices, fiscal 
deficits, fiscal transfers and competitiveness. The magnitude of changes in output or prices 
does of course critically depend on the size of the shock and the values of the various 
modelparameters as reported in Table 1. The exact numbers are of less interest to us here, 
because we rather want to focus on qualitative conclusions from the observed adjustment 
patterns and the differences in the adjustment dynamics between both countries and the 
different settings we consider.
As a consequence of the shock, output in both countries (panel (a) and (b)) immediately 
falls and so does inflation as the Phillips curve shifts downward. The drop in output induces a 
gradual fall in prices (panel (c) and (d)). This deflationary process stimulates output, and 
output and prices gradually return to their initial equilibrium level. Since the shock is 
symmetric and the countries are symmetric in terms of the modelparameters, adjustment of all
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variables is identical in both countries12. Consequently, there are no transfers (panel (g)) and 
outcomes under EMU(A) and EMU(C) coincide. Because of the symmetric adjustment 
patterns in output and prices, competitiveness (panel (h)) is not affected in any of the regimes 
and is equal to zero in all periods. At a national level the fiscal deficit (panel (e) and (f)) can 
be used to counteract the contractionary effect of the adverse macroeconomic shock as is 
shown for the adjustment process under EMU(B). Output and price variability in that case are 
less than in case of EMU(A). In the simulation shown in Figure 1 of Appendix B the 
assumption of nominal wage rigidity is made, if  one assumes real wage rigidity in both 
countries the main difference is that the fall in output is more prolonged and, consequently, 
the price adjustment process takes more time.
From Figure 1 only an imprecise assessment of the welfare effects of the demand shocks in 
the different regimes is possible. In order to be more precise, we use (16) to calculate these 
welfare effects. In doing so we have set 5i=5i*=1 and 5 2= 5 2*=53= 5 3*=2.513. In Table 2 we 
calculate the welfare losses that result in the different EMU regimes.
Table 2
Welfare under Symmetric Shocks in an EMU with Uniform Wage Formation 
(^ = - 0 .0 1 , ^ * = - 0 .0 1 , p=0 , ^*=0 )
country 1 country 2 average difference
EMU(A) 0.8028 0.8028 0.8028 0
EMU(B) 0.4413 0.4413 0.4413 0
EMU(C) 0.8028 0.8028 0.8028 0
Welfare losses for country 1 and 2 are given in the second and third columns and can be used 
to calculate the (unweighed) average welfare loss (fourth column) and the difference in
12 Actually, in a setting with symmetric countries and symmetric macroeconomic shocks, asymmetric 
adjustment and a case for the EFTS would arise in case the symmetric shocks would have different persistence 
in both countries. In that case p would differ from p*. While not uninteresting, we focus in the remainder of the 
analysis on the case where symmetric shocks have also symmetric persistence.
13 Hence, even though our model displays Keynesian features in the short run, this combination of the 
weights in the loss function gives relatively high weights to the costs of fiscal policy compared to the benefits of 
stabilisation.
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welfare losses (fifth column). As might be expected, fiscal stabilisation (EMU(B)) reduces 
welfare losses. With symmetry in structure and macroeconomic shocks, adjustment dynamics 
in both countries are identical and there is no rational for the federal transfer system and 
welfare losses under EMU(C) equal those under EMU(A).
3.2 Symmetric Shocks in an EMU with Differences in Wage Formation
Next, and more interestingly, we focus on the effects of symmetric shocks in an EMU where 
countries differ in their degree of wage indexation. In the literature on EMU almost exclusive 
emphasis has been given on the case of (a)symmetric shocks and identical countries. We 
would also like to draw the attention to the possibility that countries with structural 
differences decide to form a monetary union. Assume, therefore, that both countries are 
symmetric w.r.t. all structural parameters -as found in Table 1-, except w.r.t. |i, the parameter 
in (2) that measures to what extent nominal wages are indexed to changes in consumer prices. 
We assume that country 1 continues to be characterised by nominal wage rigidity, i.e. |i=0, 
but now country 2 displays real wage rigidity, i.e. |i*=114.
The effects of a contractionary demand shock of 1% are displayed in Figure 2. As 
compared to the case of a uniform wage formation of section 3.1 and Figure 1, output (panel 
(a) and (b)) and price reactions (panel (c) and (d)) in country 1 are -not very surprisingly- 
rather similar. The situation in country 2, where |i=1, is more interesting. Even though the 
initial adverse output effect is the same in both countries, price adjustment in country 2 takes 
more time with the result that compared to the demand shock in section 3.1 in country 2: (i) 
the negative output gap is more persistent and (ii) deflation is also more persistent in country 
2. Both effects help to explain why, notwithstanding the occurrence of a symmetric shock, a 
transfer from country 1 to country 2 develops in EMU(C) (panel (g)). This last result is a 
strong reminder of the fact that a discussion of stabilisation policies for an EMU in which 
only shocks may vary across countries can be misleading if countries also differ with respect 
to structural parameters, i.e. the value of |i.
Since both countries experience a negative demand shock, fiscal deficits are positive in 
both countries during the adjustment process in EMU(B) (panel (e) and (f)). Note that because 
country 2 has to cope with a deeper recession, it also has relatively more prolonged budget 
deficits. Another interesting difference with the example of a symmetric demand shock with a 
uniform wage formation in section 3.1 is that the demand shock now leads to a change in 
competitiveness c (panel (h)). Due to the relatively more pronounced deflation in country 2
14 The reverse is, of course, also feasible and this may turn out to be important in case shocks are asymmetric 
as well, see section 3.4
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competitiveness improves in country 2 which helps to stimulate the demand for goods 
produced in this country, thereby partly off-setting the contractionary effect of the shock in 
country 2 (the reverse, of course, holds for country 1).
Table 3 calculates the welfare effects.
Table 3
Welfare under Symmetric Shocks in an EMU with Asymmetric Wage Formation 
(ud= - 0 .0 1 , ud*=-0 .0 1 , p=0 , p*=1 )
country 1 country 2 average difference
EMU(A) 0.9170 1.2597 1.0883 0.3428
EMU(B) 0.4807 0.6733 0.5770 0.1925
EMU(C) 0.9810 1.1823 1.0817 -0.2013
Once more, for both countries the case of EMU(B) is clearly superior in terms of welfare 
compared to the "no stabilisation policy" case of EMU(A). While EMU(C) is beneficial for 
country 2, average welfare losses are only marginally smaller than for EMU(A) and 
considerably higher than under EMU(B). From Figure 2 it can readily be seen that the case of 
EMU(C), the system of transfers, is welfare inferior compared to the policy of fiscal 
flexibility on the national level: for both countries the variability of output and inflation is less 
with EMU(B) than with EMU(C).15 Hence, symmetric shocks in an EMU with structural 
differences clearly calls for fiscal flexibility at the national level. It is also interesting to 
compare the welfare results in Table 3 with the welfare losses in Table 2. Especially country 2 
experiences larger welfare losses. Its economy adjusts more sluggishly now after the 
symmetric shock in EMU. In the case of EMU(C) country 1 is not only forced to transfer 
funds to country 2, but the resulting welfare loss of the policy of transfers is higher than in 
case of EMU(A) which thus implies country 1 would be better off if  it was decided to conduct 
no stabilisation policy at all.
3.3 Asymmetric Shocks in an EMU with Uniform Wage Formation
In our third example we focus on an EMU that consists of countries that are similar in terms 
of wage formation (and all other structural parameters), but which are subject to asymmetric
15 Inspection of (A.2) in Appendix A which gives the aggregate demand equation for both countries reveals 
that both types of fiscal policy affect the economy in a different way. Whereas both policies directly influence 
the demand for goods in the home country through their effect on y , the policy of transfers also has an impact 
through y *.
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shocks. This combination of asymmetric shocks and identical countries has received most 
attention in the discussion about fiscal policy under EMU. We assume that a negative demand 
shock of 1% hits country 1 and that there is nominal wage rigidity in both countries. The 
resulting adjustment process is given in Figure 3. In country 1 output (panel (a)) immediately 
falls. Through the import leakage, output of country 2 (panel (b)) also is affected. Given the 
different responses of output, price reactions (panel (c) and (d)) accordingly also differ. 
Deflation is more pronounced in country 1 which causes a (temporary) improvement in the 
competitiveness c (panel (h)) of country 1 and this dampens the contractionary effects of the 
demand shock somewhat in country 1 (at the expense of country 2). In case of EMU(B) where 
national fiscal flexibility is used as a policy instrument, a similar picture emerges with the 
deficit reaction being more pronounced in country 1 (panel (e) and (f)).
As can be seen from Table 4, stabilisation policy by means of national fiscal stabilisation is 
welfare improving for both countries compared with EMU(A).
Table 4
Welfare under Asymmetric Shocks in an EMU with Uniform Wage Formation 
(ud= - 0 .0 1 , ud*=0, ^=0 , ^*=0 )
country 1 country 2 average difference
EMU(A) 0.4903 0.0467 0.2687 0.4434
EMU(B) 0.3010 0.0136 0.1618 0.2963
EMU(C) 0.3902 0.1152 0.2527 0.2750
Since the shock is asymmetric, the case of EMU(C) where federal fiscal stabilisation is 
conducted by means of (8) is relevant. The relatively strong recession in country 1 leads to a 
transfer from country 2 to country 1 (panel g). Although compared to EMU(A) stabilisation 
by means of the EFTS is good news for country 1 in terms of welfare, this is not the case for 
country 216. For the latter the transfer depresses output to the extent that it would be better off 
without a stabilisation policy at all. On average a federal stabilisation system is welfare 
superior compared with the "no policy" regime of EMU(A). At any rate, fiscal flexibility 
outperfoms the EFTS. Hence, the idea that a system of automatic transfers might be a good 
way of dealing with (a)symmetric shocks is, at least in our Mundell-Fleming model of the 
EMU, subject to some important qualifications. It is certainly not superior compared with
16 Our analysis focuses on the effects of one unique macroeconomic shock. In a full stochastic analysis with 
shocks hitting country 1 and country 2 randomly, the case for an EFTS would increase further as it provides 
both countries -not only country 1 as in our example- a certain degree insurance against the adverse effects of 
asymmetric shocks.
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automatic stabilisation on the national level. This point is also made by Eichengreen (1996).17
3.4 Asymmetric Shocks in an EMU with Differences in Wage Formation
A fourth example arises if  not only macroeconomic shocks are asymmetric but also the degree 
of wage indexation differs between the two countries. To grasp the relevance of allowing for 
differences in |i in this example, it is insightful to compare the simulation results in Figure 4a 
and 4b with the case of asymmetric shocks and a uniform wage formation shown in Figure 3. 
Two cases need to be distinguished. In the first one, the shock hits country 1 in a setting 
where country 1 displays nominal wage rigidity and country 2 real wage rigidity. In the 
second case, the shock still hits country 1 but now country 1 displays real wage rigidity and 
country 2 nominal wage rigidity.
The simulation results of the first case are shown in Figure 4a. The asymmetric negative 
demand shock of 1% in country 1 leads to an instantaneous fall in output of country 1 (panel 
(a)) and the by now well-known subsequent price adjustments (panel (c)). Output also starts to 
contract in country 2 (panel (b)). As can be seen from comparing Figure 3 with Figure 4a the 
effects of the demand shocks for country 1 are very similar. The same conclusion holds for the 
reactions in terms of fiscal flexibility f  (panel (e)), the transfers z (panel (g)) and 
competitiveness c (panel (h)). Therefore, welfare losses in country 1 as calculated in the first 
part of Table 5 below are not much different from those in Table 3.
Things are, however, somewhat different for country 2 where, due to the existence of real 
wage rigidity, it does take more time to establish price stability and to close the output gap. 
This also has interesting policy implications which can be detected by comparing Figure 3 
with Figure 4a. Given that the output and price effects of the demand shock are more 
prolonged in country 2, the fiscal deficits in the EMU(B) scenario have to be sustained for a 
number of additional periods (panel f). In the EMU(C) scenario, the transfers, it is still true 
that funds are transferred from country 2 to country 1 but the amount of transfers is smaller 
reflecting the relative better performance of country 2 in the asymmetric shock example with 
a uniform wage formation. According to Table 5, welfare losses in country 2 are slightly 
higher in all EMU cases than in section 3.3 when country 2 featured nominal wage rigidity 
and more adjustment capability. All in all, the differences between Figure 4a and Figure 3 and 
the corresponding welfare losses in Table 4 and the first part of Table 5 are not very 
substantial.
17 The fact that ceteris paribus (compare f.i. Table 2 with Table 4) the difference in average welfare loss 
between EMU(B) and (EMU(C) is larger for symmetric shocks as compared to asymmetric shocks is not 
surprising since in case of symmetric shocks EMU(B) implies that both countries are engaged in stabilising the 
economy.
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Table 5
Welfare under Asymmetric Shocks in an EMU with Asymmetric Wage Formation 
(ud=-0 .0 1 , ud*=0 , (a) ^=0 , p*=1 , (b) ^=1 , ^*=0 )
country 1 country 2 average difference
(a)
EMU(A) 0.5258 0.0763 0.3011 0.4494
EMU(B) 0.3224 0.0261 0.1742 0.2962
EMU(C) 0.4352 0.1470 0.2910 0.2884
(b)
EMU(A) 0.7270 0.0598 0.3934 0.6672
EMU(B) 0.4360 0.0171 0.2265 0.4189
EMU(C) 0.5704 0.1556 0.3631 0.4146
This last conclusion needs to be qualified (at least in a quantitative sense) in the second 
case where an asymmetric demand shock hits country 1, which now features real wage 
rigidity, whereas country 2 features nominal wage rigidity, implying that |i=1 and |i*=0. The 
adjustment in this EMU setting is given in Figure 4b. As might be expected, if  in the country 
where the shock takes place, real instead of nominal consumption wage rigidity prevails, the 
main effect is that output and price adjustments take more time (panels (a) and (c)). Also for 
country 2 the price adjustment changes: nominal instead of real wage rigidity in country 2 
implies that the transmission of the demand shock from country 1 has more modest effects on 
output and prices (compare Figures 4a and 4b panels (b) and (d)). Again, the reason for this is 
that a relatively speedier adjustment takes place if nominal instead of real wages are sticky. 
Transfers z to the country where the demand shock takes place are higher in the second 
example (panel (g)). Another subtle difference between Figures 4a and 4b is that the change in 
real competitiveness c is more pronounced in Figure 4b because there is hardly any deflation 
in country 2, implying a greater improvement in c for the country 1 that is hit by the 
contractionary demand shock (panel (h)).
The welfare effects of the second case are given in the second part of Table 5. If one 
compares the welfare results with the first case (asymmetric shock, |i=0 in country 1 and |i*=1 
in country 2) and Table 4 (asymmetric shock, |i=0 in both countries) it becomes clear that the 
welfare loss for country 1, the country invariably hit by the shock, are about 30% larger in 
case this country is characterized by real instead of nominal wage rigidity. In country 2 
transfers are still an inefficient policy instrument: the welfare loss stays about the same 
following the switch of country 2 from real to nominal wage rigidity whereas the welfare 
losses for EMU(A) and EMU(B) dwindle.
For the EMU as a whole the larger welfare losses for country 1 are somewhat mitigated by
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the smaller welfare losses in country 2 but the average welfare loss is nonetheless also greater 
in the case shown in Figure 4b. Despite the differences between Figures 2, 4a and 4b, it 
remains true that (irrespective of the assumptions regarding the degree of wage indexation) 
the preferred regime ranking for the EMU as a whole in case of an asymmetric shock is 
B>C>A .18
If one compares Figure 3 (asymmetric demand shock with uniform wage formation) with 
Figure 4 and 4b (asymmetric demand shock with differences in wage indexation) the first 
conclusion must be that -as opposed to the case of a symmetric shock- the introduction of a 
different degree of wage indexation does not lead to qualitatively different simulation results. 
But this does not mean that there are no relevant (quantitative) differences in terms of welfare 
as can be seen from Tables 3 and 5. It also matters a great deal for the effectiveness of the 
national and federal fiscal policy instruments whether a country is characterised by nominal or 
real consumption wage rigidity. The second conclusion is that country 1, the country hit by 
the adverse demand shock, is better off if  country 2 is characterized by nominal instead of real 
consumption wage rigidity (compare the second column in the upper and lower half of Table 
5). This illustrates a more general point. If a country is hit by a macroeconomic shock, it will 
be better off -irrespective of its own degree of wage indexation- if  it forms a monetary union 
with a country characterised by nominal wage rigidity. The reason for this is that nominal 
wage rigidity in the foreign country implies that output and prices return quicker to their long- 
run equilibrium levels than if real wage rigidity prevails, thereby increasing imports from the 
home country (both because of higher output and deteriorating competitiveness of the foreign 
economy) and inducing higher transfers towards the home country.
4. Fiscal Stabilisation, Economic Integration and Welfare under EMU
The preceding analysis showed that it is important in the context of EMU not only to 
distinguish between symmetric and asymmetric shocks but also to consider the degree of 
structural (a)symmetry between the EMU countries. Our attention in particular focused on the 
wage formation process of the EMU countries. We varied the degree of symmetry of 
macroeconomic shocks, wage indexation and national and federal fiscal flexibility and 
showed how these variables affect macroeconomic outcomes and welfare losses in EMU. The 
observed dynamic adjustment patterns are -even in our stylized model- the result of the 
complex interaction of output and price dynamics, the fiscal policies and the interaction with 
the other EMU country. From a policy perspective we focused on the usefulness of fiscal 
stabilisation both by national fiscal policies and federal fiscal policies. In all settings, we
18 For country 2 the ranking in case of an asymmetric shock is, however, B>A>C.
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found that fiscal flexibility at the national level may be conducive to stabilise macroeconomic 
fluctuations under EMU. In addition, in a number of cases also federal fiscal flexibility was 
shown to be relevant and useful. Our analysis suggests that elimination of fiscal flexibility 
under EMU deteriorates the adjustment capacity of the economies and therefore would result 
in suboptimal economic performance.
Welfare losses according to (16) are the direct result o f these complex adjustment 
dynamics of output, prices and policies and the interaction and interdependency with the other 
EMU country, as indicated on p.719. In this section we explore in a bit more detail the 
relations between fiscal stabilisation, economic integration and welfare in our EMU model. 
First, we analyse how welfare varies with changes in the parameters 3 and !, that measure the 
responsiveness of the 2 fiscal policies to deviations of output from its natural level. Second, 
we investigate how welfare varies if  the degree of economic integration is changed. Here, we 
focus on changes in the responsiveness of net exports w.r.t. competitiveness, as measured by 
a.
Our interest in 3 and ! results from the possibility to choose values of 3 and ! which 
minimise the welfare loss given the nature of the shock and the structure of the economy. In 
other words, we would want to analyse welfare losses as a function of 3 or !. Figure 5 shows 
the welfare losses as a function of 3 .
Figure 5
Welfare Losses as a Function of 3 (=3*)
19 In addition, the rate of time preference and the weights in the loss functions have an effect on the exact 
welfare losses that result in the different settings that are considered.
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Apart from 3  all other parameter values remain unchanged (see Table 1) and, for the sake of 
brevity, we focus on the case shown in Figure 4b of an asymmetric demand shock in country 
1 and where country 1 displays real wage rigidity and country 2 nominal wage rigidity.20 
Figure 5 shows the welfare losses as a function of 3  and 3* and it therewith illustrates the 
welfare effects under the EMU(B) regime for 0<3=3 *<2.21 The left panel of Figure 5 shows 
the welfare losses for both countries. For country 1 there is clearly a trade-off between 
stabilising output and prices on the one hand and the welfare costs associated with fiscal 
deficits on the other hand (see (16)). The welfare loss is minimized for 3 ~0.5 in this specific 
example and for values of 3>0.5 the costs of fiscal flexibility thus start to outweigh the 
benefits. For country 2 there is no such trade off, the relatively small fiscal deficit (remember 
country 1 is "shocked" and country 2, with |i*=0, also has a smoother price adjustment 
process) implies that the welfare costs of fiscal stabilisation are low and that this country 
would opt for a (infinitely) large value of 3 *. The right panel of Figure 5 gives the average 
welfare loss and intra-country difference welfare loss as function of the two fiscal flexibility 
parameters. Both curves tell more or less the same story: fiscal stabilisation is welfare 
enhancing (if 3=3*=0 the EMU(A) regime results), but only up to a certain value of 3 . 
Beyond this value the costs associated with fiscal deficits, f.i. in terms of the 'Stability Pact', 
are greater than the stabilisation benefits.
Next, we consider the same case of an asymmetric demand shock in country 1 and where 
country 1 displays real wage rigidity and country 2 nominal wage rigidity, but where we vary 
the amount of fiscal flexibility in federal fiscal policies. Figures 6 shows the welfare losses as 
a function of !.
Figure 6
Welfare Losses as a Function of !
20 In section 3 both fiscal policy parameters were either 0 or 0.25 depending on the EMU regime under 
consideration. Simulations like the ones shown in Figures 5-7 can, of course, also be derived for the other 
examples discussed in section 3.
21 In Figure 5 we have assumed that 5=0 and in Figure 6  that X=X*=0.
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Now there is no fiscal flexibility at the national level, i.e. 3=3*=0 . The left panel of Figure 6 
leads for country 1 again to the conclusion that there is an optimum value for the transfer 
parameter (!opt~0.7 in this specific example). Assuming that a transfer system involves 
administrative and monitoring costs a policy of fiscal transfers does thus not lead to a 
optimum value !opt"^ for the country receiving the transfers. Things are different for country 
2. We saw already in section 3.4 that for this country "doing nothing" is welfare superior to a 
policy of transfers which means that the optimum level of ! is 0. On average -see the right 
panel of Figure 6- a system of transfers is, however, better than the no stabilisation regime of 
EMU(A) where !=0. This is due to the fact (see also the welfare loss difference in Figure 6) 
that up to a certain value of !, the positive net benefits of the transfer system for country 1 
clearly outweigh the negative net benefits for country 2. In this sense Figure 6 indicates that a 
transfer system can reduce intra-EU welfare differences in such away that it leads to a higher 
level of welfare for the monetary union as a whole.22
Finally, we analyse how changes in a  -which depicts the responsiveness of aggregate 
demand w.r.t. competitiveness- affect welfare losses. Simulations with respect to variations in 
a  are interesting because the extent to which shocks and fiscal policies are transmitted, does 
depend crucially on the degree of economic integration. As stated in the introduction of this 
section, we are interested in the welfare effects of changes in the degree of economic 
integration between the two countries because the strength of the various transmission 
channels determines to what extent a country is affected by the economic developments in the 
other country. In line with the analysis of L(3) and L(!), one can conceive welfare to be a 
function a the parameters measuring the degree o f economic integration. Figures 7 shows the 
welfare losses as a function of a.
22 Note however, in line with the simulation results in section 3, that the minimum value of L( ) is lower than 
that for L(©.
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Figure 7
Welfare Losses as a Function of a
The left panel of Figure 7 shows for both countries welfare as a function of a  (see (4)).23 An 
increase in this parameter means improved competitiveness for country 1 and hence an 
increased demand for the goods produced by country 1 (the reverse, of course, is true for 
country 2). Figure 7 indicates that country 1, following its improved competitiveness due to a 
relatively strong deflation, would prefer a  to be infinitely large to the extent that the negative 
consequences of the demand shock are off-set by the increase in demand due to the resulting 
rise in competitiveness c. For country 2 the optimum value of a  is not (as one might perhaps 
expect) 0 but about 0.45. Country 2 is initially not affected by the shock, but output and prices 
fall nevertheless somewhat due to the various channels transmitting the shock. In this sense 
country 2 would welcome a swift return of output and prices in country 1 to their long-run 
equilibrium levels. Given the relatively slow price adjustment process in country 1 (^=1), an 
increase in competitiveness inter alia helps to bring about such a return. It is therefore possible 
that for a certain range of parameter values the benefits of an increase in a  outweigh the costs 
in terms of a fall of competitiveness. But if  a  increases further the loss of competitiveness 
starts to dominate the welfare outcome. On average, see the right panel of Figure 7, the 
monetary union benefits if a  increases.
5. Conclusions
23 As with Figure 5 and 6 , Figure 7 is also based on the case of an asymmetric demand shock hitting country 
1 given real wage rigidity in country 1 and nominal wage rigidity in country 2. Apart from all parameter 
values are the same as those reported in Table 1.
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In this paper we have used a variant of a two country Mundell-Fleming model to analyse the 
effects of fiscal stabilisation in a monetary union. Economic shocks can be symmetric or 
asymmetric in the model and, most importantly, the economic developments between the two 
countries can also vary because of a different degree of wage indexation.
By means of simulations we showed how the impact of economic shocks on macro­
economic performance as well as the effectiveness of fiscal policy may depend heavily on the 
assumed wage formation process. In the literature on the role of fiscal policy in the EMU, 
countries are invariably assumed to be the same as far as the underlying models of the 
economies concerned. Cross-country differences in macroeconomic adjustment must then be 
the result of asymmetric shocks. In our view this approach neglects the importance of 
structural differences between European countries. We used simulations with our model to 
show that, compared to the case where the economic structure of countries is assumed to be 
the same, a negative demand shock can lead to substantial differences in macro-economic 
performance and policy effectiveness if  countries are allowed to differ with respect to wage 
indexation. The calculation of the social welfare effects supports our simulation results. A 
sensitivity analysis of the welfare effects with respect to parameters measuring the degree of 
fiscal stabilisation and economic integration indicated that for a range of these parameter 
values fiscal stabilisation is welfare enhancing for the union as a whole despite the fact that 
fiscal stabilisation also entails costs. A fruitful line for further research would be to analyse 
(on a more detailed level) additional structural disparities between EMU-members and their 
implications for stabilisation policies in- and outside EMU.
-23-
A ppendix A  System  D ynam ics
As mentioned in the main text, our basic model of (1)-(11) can be reduced to a dynamic 
system in the producer price levels of both countries and which from the complete dynamic 
adjustment of the model follows. Combining (1)-(3) enables to write the aggregate supply of 
goods by the domestic and foreign economies
y s = P( 1 - ^ P  -  P^(1_Y)P * - $ u w (A.1a)
y s* = p*(1- | i *y*)p* -  p*|i*(1-Y*)P - P* (A1b)
The aggregate demand for the output in both economies is found from (4)-(8), (10)-(11): 
S(y + 1-y*X , S(y* + 1-y)> * ... ^  . 5k
X +X* X +X*
(o+r|g- ^K )y* + ôyp + ô(1-y)p>*-■ ^
X +X*
( * s*(y* +1-yX  * / *( - a  - — —--------—)p  + (a -
X +X*
X +X* 
ô* (Y + 1- Y*^
X +X*
,(A.2a)
-(um + um* ) + u dy ’
, , ))P - fr* (x* + 9 + V -1
X+X* X + (A2.b)
( o + ^ g - _ ^ K_ ) y  + p *+r  (1-y* )p - _ ^ _  ( u m+ u ^  ) + u
X +X* X +X*
Ex-post, the aggregate supply of output in a country must equal the aggregate demand for 
its output. Therefore we find output in country 1 when equating (A.2a) and (A.2b) and output 
in country 2 when equating (A.1b) and (A.2b) imposing that the common nominal interest 
rate, i, clears the European money market, implying that money demand equals the money 
supply set by the ECB, i.e. m+m*=iiiE. Substituting the resulting expression into the Phillips 
curve (7) gives the dynamics of price adjustment in both economies:
(A.3)p
a11 a12 P + u1
p*. a21 a22 P*. u2
in which aif equals:
A4A3
A4ô*v*A1(A3 )
A4A2
A4ô*v*A1(A2+_
"*2 ' * ' * * * ) ai2 hl(A3H * ' * * *
A1 A ^ A ^ - A ^ - v 'A ^ * )  A1 A ^ A ^ - A ^ - i
4 2
A4A3
A ^ v A ^ A ^------ )
2^3
1 1( 1 1 4 4 1 )
At equals,
-) a22= h2 ^ 2
A4 A3
a ; ôva;(a3+-^
1 A1^ i [ - A A * - i
(A.4a)
(A.4b)
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A, = _ ^ _ + t 1(x+S)
^ - a - ^ ± r i .
x+x*
X+X*
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P(1 -m o A; = - a * - 5  (y + 1  Y)- p * ( i - ^ y )  
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X^ X*
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X^ X*
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v A ^ A ^ - A ^ ^ A ^ * )h — _____________________________________________
1 (A1A1*-A4A44-vA1*6 )(A1A1*-A4A44-v*A16 *)-vA4 6 V A 4 6  (A.6a)
h _____________v A ^ A ^ - A ^ - v A ^ ) ___________  (A 6b)
^  A1 - A4A4 - vA ^S)^ A1 - A4A4 - v*A16 *) - vA46*v*A46
and u,
4 4ux= h1( ( U ---------- 4-------4-------- )(u d+ P u w— ——— (um+um*-m E))
a 1*(a1a 1'- a 4a 4-v*a1s*) k+x*
+ (— +-------- V A1--------------)(ud* + p*uw* - - ( u m+um*-mE))) (A.7a)
A1 A1'(A1A1'-A4A4-v*A1S*) x+x*
A! A4SvAr , 5 _ „
u2= h2((— +----------4-----1-------- )(ud+Puw- ——  (um+um*-m E))
A1 A1^ ^ ; - A ^ 4^vA ;8) k+V (A.7b)
4 4+ (1 +---------- 4-----4-------- )(ud* + p*uw— (um+um*-m E)))
1( 1 1 4 4 1 )
All macroeconomic shocks take the form of impulses that hit the economies at t=0 and decay 
at a speed p, implying ud=ud(0).e~pt, ud*=ud*(0).e~pt, uw=uw(0).ept, uw=uw(0).ept, uw*=uw*(0).ept, 
um=um(0).ept and um*=um*(0).ept.
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A ppendix B G raphs o f the Sim ulations
(a)
(c)
5~~
(e)
(b)
(d)
(f)
(g) (h) 
Figure 1
Symmetric Demand Shock, Symmetric Countries (u°=-0.01, ud*=-0.01, ^=0, ^*=0 
____E M U (A )____ EMU(B) .........EMU(C)
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Symmetric Demand Shock, Asymmetric Countries (u°=-0.01, ud*=-0.01, ^=0, ^*=1) 
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Asymmetric Demand Shock, Symmetric Countries (u°=-0.01, ud*=0, ^=0, ^*=0)
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